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A Rule for Determining When Patent 
Misuse Should be Applied  
Katherine E. White* 
INTRODUCTION 
The new Millennium brings with it a change in how vitally 
innovative technology affects the global economy.  With this 
change, patent law is growing in importance.  The manner in 
which patented inventions are licensed and sold is crucial to the 
direction of the new world economy.  Anticompetitive effects in 
patent license agreements or conditional sale restrictions should be 
minimized, as they contravene public policy.  To attain a balance 
between granting exclusive patent rights to encourage 
technological development and competition in the marketplace, 
laws exist to curtail anticompetitive behavior.  The contemporary 
law of patents recognizes its own anticompetitive effects and 
embeds the doctrine of patent misuse to limit these effects.  
Focusing only on the level of competition in the market, the 
antitrust laws police anticompetitive effect. 
In recent years, there has been a shift away from applying patent 
misuse.  Because antitrust and patent misuse are derived from 
different theoretical foundations, one should not completely 
supplant the other.  Patent misuse is a broader doctrine than 
antitrust law.  While an antitrust violation involving a patent 
always constitutes patent misuse,1 one can have misuse without an 
antitrust violation.2  Furthermore, some anticompetitive behavior 
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 1 Alan J. Weinschel and Robert P. Stefanski, Antitrust and Patent Misuse in 
Licensing: Part I, 7 No. 11 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 18, 18 (1995). 
 2 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969); Morton Salt 
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffart, 803 
F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see Alan J. Weinschel and Robert P. Stefanski , 7 No. 11 J. 
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still needs to be curtailed even when an antitrust violation cannot 
be proven. 3 
Patent misuse is a doctrine that seeks to balance the idea that a 
patent is an absolute property right with the notion that a patent 
must be exercised in a manner consistent with the public policies 
underlying its grant.4  Because activities giving rise to patent 
misuse often have actual or anticipated adverse effects on 
competition, a close relationship exists between patent misuse and 
antitrust law.5 
Patent misuse differs from antitrust theory because the purpose 
of misuse is to avoid extending the patent monopoly, while 
antitrust law weighs the effect of acts on competition.6  
Consequently, patent misuse has been used as a shield against 
patent infringement and as an affirmative defense, while antitrust 
claims have acted as a sword in litigation, with the potential for 
recovery of treble damages under the Clayton Act.7 
Though patent misuse and antitrust law are related, they should 
not be conflated due to their separate origins.  Patent misuse 
springs from the common law doctrine of unclean hands, as well as 
the public policy underlying patent law.8  The public policy behind 
patent law is to grant exclusive rights to a new and nonobvious 
invention for a limited time in exchange for its disclosure to the 
 
PROPRIETARY RTS. 18,19 (1995). 
 3 Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 140. See Robert Merges, Reflections on Current 
Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 793, 795 
(1988). 
 4 See Hensley Equip. Co., Inc. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(stating that “[t]he rationale of the doctrine is a rejection of the concept of the patent as an 
absolute property right in favor of its definition as a right which must not be exercised in 
a manner not consistent with the constitutionally-defined purpose for which it was 
conferred, i.e., to ‘promote the Progress of the useful Arts.’” (citing  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
8)). 
 5 Hensley, 383 F.2d at 261 (quoting Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 
386, 415 (1945)) (“So long as the patent owner is using his patent in violation of the 
antitrust laws, he cannot restrain infringement of it by others.”). 
 6 See 6 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 19.04 [2], at 19-44-46, (2000) 
(explaining that “[a]ntitrust analysis involves a balancing of patent interests and the 
impact or likely impact of a practice on competition.  The misuse doctrine compounds the 
difficulty of balancing by substituting for competitive injury the vague concept of  
“extension.”). 
 7 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). 
 8 See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490. 
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public.9  Theoretically, such disclosure will encourage and 
facilitate competition in the market after the patent term expires.10  
The patent laws, however, are not intended to extend exclusive 
rights beyond the original scope of the patent.11 
A patent is granted only on inventions that are new and 
nonobvious.12  The patented invention is thereby “monopolized,” 
kept from the public domain, yet is still able to contribute to 
society.13  The patent misuse doctrine prohibits efforts by a 
patentee that seek to extend a patent beyond the original scope of 
its grant.14 
In 1988, Congress limited, but did not eliminate, the doctrine of 
patent misuse in the Patent Misuse Reform Act (“PMRA”).15  The 
 
 9 See Rite Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reasoning 
that “[a] patent is granted in exchange for a patentee’s disclosure of an invention, not for 
the patentee’s use of the invention.  There is no requirement in this country that a 
patentee make, use or sell its patented invention.”) (emphasis added). 
 10 See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1214-15 
(9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “[p]atent laws reward the inventor with the power to exclude 
others from making, using or selling [a patented invention] . . . [m]eanwhile, the public 
benefits both from the faster introduction of inventions and the resulting increase in 
competition.”). 
 11 See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 
(1917) (stating that “[t]he scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in 
the claims contained in it, read in light of the specification . . . [I]t is to the claims of 
every patent, therefore, that we must return to when we are seeking to determine what the 
invention is, the exclusive use of which is given to the inventor by the grant provided for 
by the statute, — ‘He can claim nothing beyond them.’” (citing Keystone Bridge Co. v. 
Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278)). 
 12 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1995). 
 13 See Giles S. Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants of Monopoly?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 239, 251 (1993) (citations omitted). The late Honorable Giles S. Rich, former 
Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, discussed this 
reconciliation as follows: 
The patent and antitrust laws are reconcilable — and easily so.  If the 
thing monopolized is in the public domain before the creation of the 
monopoly in it, the monopoly is odious, illegal, bad.  If the thing is a 
new and unobvious contribution to society, a temporary monopoly is 
a fair quid pro quo for society to pay as a reward or inducement to the 
inventor and those who took the financial risk of commercializing the 
thing in order to make it available to society.  This principle is, at the 
same time, what undergirds the law as to what may be patented, the 
law on patentability.  The thing patented must be new and 
[non]obvious. 
Id. 
 14 Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 140; Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 491; Transparent-Wrap 
Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith, 329 U.S. 637, 641 (1947). 
 15 Codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994). 
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PMRA was adopted to soften the type of harsh patent misuse 
outcome where “[a] patent owner loses the right to enforce his 
patent, at least until the conduct that has constituted the misuse has 
ceased and its effects have been purged.”16  Prior to the PMRA, 
courts had been applying patent misuse inconsistently, deciding 
analogous cases differently and finding misuse in situations where 
there was no anticompetitive effect.17  Often, misuse was found 
where the conduct had not injured the infringing party who raised 
misuse as a defense.18  In response, Congress carved out two 
exceptions where patent misuse would no longer apply without a 
showing of market power in the relevant market: (1) refusals to 
license; and (2) tying cases.19  However, requiring a showing of 
market power in these two areas has had an anticompetitive effect 
and almost merges the analysis for patent misuse into an antitrust 
rule of reason analysis.  Though Congress contemplated that these 
modifications would have a pro-competitive effect on licensing, 
insofar as they would require some linkage between patent 
licensing practice and anticompetitive conduct,20 this has not been 
the case. 
Courts, however, have narrowed the scope of patent misuse 
beyond the level Congress dictated.21  This limitation has allowed 
courts to aid and abet patentees in expanding the rights under their 
patents beyond that legally allowed under prior case law, even 
taking into account legislative changes.22  Some restrictions may 
still amount to patent misuse violations while not rising to the level 
of antitrust violations.23  One such example of this problem is 
when a patent holder restricts the use of a patented device to a 
 
 16 134 CONG. REC. S17146-02 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 
Merges supra note 3, at 795. 
 17 See supra note 16. 
 18 See id. 
 19 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (1994). 
 20 134 CONG. REC. H10646 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. 
Kastenmeier). 
 21 See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(where restricting patented medical device to single use did not violate the doctrine of 
patent misuse). 
 22 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Comment: The Economic Irrationality of the Patent 
Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L REV. 1599, 1601-07 (discussing how courts have extended 
the rights of patentees by failing to enforce the antitrust laws against them). 
 23 See id. at 1611, n.83 (explaining that nonmetered royalties, refusal to license, 
resale field of use limitations and grant-back clauses amount to patent misuse, but are not 
antitrust violations unless they constitute tying arrangements with market power). 
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single use.24  These restrictions often venture beyond the original 
scope of the patent, and consequently amount to patent misuse as 
historically contemplated by the case law, taking into account the 
1988 statutory changes.25 
This Article proposes a test for determining when patent misuse 
should be applied.  After reviewing the pertinent case law, this 
Article will demonstrate that courts have eroded the patent misuse 
doctrine beyond what is required statutorily, without deriving any 
added pro-competitive benefit as contemplated under the PMRA.  
Such erosion has assisted patentees in masking anticompetitive 
effects that could be lessened by proper application of patent 
misuse.  An example of this problem is Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, 
Inc.26 where the Federal Circuit labeled a patent holder’s single use 
restriction as a field of use restriction not amounting to per se 
antitrust or misuse violations but subject to the rule of reason.27  
After Mallinckrodt, contrary to the intent of its holding, single use 
restriction cases have been decided based on legal doctrines that 
fail to weigh pro-competitive versus anticompetitive behavior, e.g., 
the repair/reconstruction doctrine.28  Such analysis thwarts the 
ability to sufficiently balance between the exclusive patent right 
and competition in the market. 
Part I discusses the historical treatment of the Patent Misuse 
doctrine up to the current treatment after the 1988 Amendments.  
Part II proposes a test for when patent misuse should be applied 
and examines the Federal Circuit cases where single use 
restrictions were evaluated.  It also compares the court’s analysis 
with the legal approach used when applying the proposed test. Part 
III concludes that since courts have eroded the historical 
application of patent misuse without deriving any added pro-
competitive benefit, a specific rule should be implemented that 
finds patent misuse when (1) a reuse restriction is not made with 
respect to a separate product and (2) where the restriction forces 
 
 24 See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700. 
 25 See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 
(1917) (restricting consumer use of patented machine to unpatented films was an invalid 
attempt at extending patentee’s monopoly to products that he had not patented). 
 26 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Hon. Arthur J. Gajarsa et al., How Much Fuel to Add to the Fire of Genius?  
Some Questions About the Repair/Reconstruction Distinction in Patent Law, 48 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1205 (1999). 
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the buyer to purchase something that need not be bought in fixed 
proportion to the patented device since the life span of the device 
outlasts the single use. 
I.  MISUSE 
The doctrine of patent misuse began as an affirmative defense to 
patent infringement.29 This defense emerged from the equitable 
affirmative defense of “unclean hands.”30  The unclean hands 
doctrine is “invoked by a court only when a plaintiff otherwise 
entitled to relief has acted so improperly with respect to the 
controversy . . . that the public interest in punishing the plaintiff 
outweighs the need to prevent defendant’s tortious conduct.”31  
The related patent misuse doctrine requires that the alleged 
infringer show that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the 
‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with 
anticompetitive effect.32  Patent misuse does not affect a patent’s 
validity.  Once the patentee has purged the anticompetitive 
behavior, the patent may again be enforced through infringement 
suits.33 
 
 
 
 29 Windsurfing Int’l v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Bio-
Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument, 739 F.2d 604, 617 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 30 United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957) 
(stating that patent misuse is an extension of the doctrine of unclean hands); Morton Salt, 
314 U.S. at 492-93 (linking patent misuse to the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands”); 
C.R. Bard Sys. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting the defense 
of patent misuse arises from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands); B. Braun Medical, 
Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Merges, supra note 3, at 797.  
The doctrine of unclean hands, however, differs from patent misuse in important ways.  
First, the patent misuse doctrine applies to suits in law, where damages are sought, as 
well as suits in equity, where injunctive relief is sought. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm 
& Haas, 448 U.S. 176, 185 (1980); see Weinschel and Stefanski, supra note 2, at 18; see 
Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. 
REV. 1599, 1607-20 (1990); P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 184-85 
(1987) (describing remedies generally available in antirust cases). 
 31 B.M.I., Inc. v. Hearst, 746 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 32 Windsurfing, 782 F.2d  at 1001 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of 
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)). 
 33 Hensley Equip. Co., 383 F.2d at 261; see, e.g., United States Gypsum, 352 U.S. at 
465. 
WHITE.PP6 9/6/01  10:40 PM 
2001] A RULE FOR PATENT MISUSE 677 
 
There are two types of patent misuse:34  (1) an antitrust violation 
that is significantly related to the patent;35 and (2) an act whereby 
the patentee has sought to extend the patent beyond the original 
scope of its grant, not necessarily amounting to an antitrust 
violation.36 One of the most illustrative cases discussing the patent 
misuse doctrine is Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.37 
In Morton Salt, the court reflected on the reason for the patent 
grant and the importance of limiting the patentee’s monopoly 
protection so that it extends only within that grant:38 
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege 
of a patent monopoly carries out a public policy 
adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, ‘to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . 
Inventors the exclusive Right . . .’ to their ‘new and 
useful’ inventions . . . .39  But the public policy, 
which includes inventions within the granted 
monopoly, excludes from it all that is not embraced 
in the invention.40  It equally forbids the use of the 
patent to secure an exclusive right or limited 
monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and 
which it is contrary to public policy to grant.41 
 
 34 Robert J. Hoerner, Patent Misuse, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 641, 641-42 (1985). 
 35 See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 419 (1945) (noting 
that “[s]o long as the patent owner is using his patent in violation of the antitrust laws, he 
cannot restrain infringement of it by others.”). 
 36 The Supreme Court has never required that an antitrust violation be proven to 
establish patent misuse. See, e.g., Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 140; Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 
491; Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 329 U.S. at 641.  See also 134 CONG. REC. H10, 
646-02 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenheimer) (stating that [t]he term 
“market power” is used in the [Patent Misuse Act] in order to permit the courts to 
reasonably assess the potential for anticompetitive effect of a particular practice.  We 
have chosen not to explicitly guide the courts as to the level of “market power” required 
for a finding of misuse.  We do expect, however, that the courts will be guided - though 
not bound - by post and future decisions of the Supreme Court in the context of antitrust 
analysis of unlawful tie-ins.) (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 
2 (1984); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)). 
 37 314 U.S. 488. 
 38 Id. at 492. 
 39 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.). 
 40 Id. at 492; see also International Salt v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 
(stating that the patents conferred no right to restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented salt; 
thus no antitrust immunity attached). 
 41 Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492; see also International Salt, 332 U.S. at 395-96. 
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The Court went on to say that where a patentee is using its patent 
to restrain competition in the sale of unpatented products, the 
underlying policy of granting patents is thwarted.42  As such, 
“[e]quity may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the 
patent by declining to entertain a suit for infringement.”43  
Furthermore, the court should continue to withhold assistance until 
the anticompetitive practice is abandoned and the effects of the 
patent misuse have been purged.44 
The Court then applied this rule to the facts in the case.  In 
Morton Salt, the patent holder patented a machine for depositing 
salt tablets that was useful in the canning industry.45  The trial 
court found that the patentee tied the lease of its patented machines 
to the purchase of unpatented salt tablets that were specifically 
designed for use in the patented salt-dispensing machines.46  This 
tying thereby assisted in creating a limited monopoly in the salt 
tablets. Such monopolization was not within the patent grant, 
which only gave the patentee an exclusive right to make, use, and 
vend the machine described and claimed in the patent.47  
On appeal, the Court stated that “a patent affords no immunity 
for a monopoly not within the patent grant.”48  The use of a patent 
“to suppress competition in the sale of an unpatented article may 
deprive the patentee of the aid of a court of equity to restrain an 
alleged infringement by one who is a competitor.”49  The Morton 
Salt Court held that the patentee could not claim protection of the 
patent grant to avoid an antitrust violation.50  The Court further 
held that the patentee’s infringement suit was against public policy, 
and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of patentee’s complaint for 
want of equity.51  Consequently, it was unnecessary for the Court 
to decide whether the plaintiff had violated the Clayton Act.52 In 
other words, the patent misuse defense was used as a defense to 
 
 42 Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493. 
 43 Id. at 493, construed in Berlenbach v. Anderson and Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 
782, 784 (9th Cir. 1964). 
 44 Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493. 
 45 Id. at 488. 
 46 Id. at 491. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 491. 
 50 Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). 
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patent infringement, without having to prove an antitrust violation 
under the Clayton Act.53 
Over the years, there have been complaints that patent misuse 
has become overreaching, applying to situations that go beyond 
those intended.54 Courts have been inconsistent in their application 
of the doctrine to analogous practices.  Furthermore, misuse has 
been found where conduct has had no anticompetitive effect55 or 
where the conduct has not injured the infringing party who raised 
misuse as a defense.56 
 
In response to these concerns, the United States Senate passed a 
bill requiring that a “court find a violation of the antitrust laws, 
after undertaking an economic analysis, before it can find a patent 
 
 53 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE § 5.5b at 218 (1994). 
 54 See 134 CONG. REC. H10, 646-02 (daily ed. October 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. 
Kastenheimer) (stating that the patent misuse doctrine was developed to address 
anticompetitive effects in patent licensing agreements but has extended its application to 
covenants not to compete, price-fixing, resale price maintenance, and grant backs).  See 
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohn and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 917, 201 (1980) (stating “a patentee 
may sell a nonstaple article . . . while enjoining others from marketing that same good 
without authorization.”); See Mercoid Co. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. 320 U.S. 661, 664 
(1944) (holding a patentee could not prevent a competitor from making an unpatented 
switch used in a patented combination, even if the switch could only be sued to infringe 
patentee’s patent).  See L. Peter Farkas, Can a Patent Still be Misused?, 59 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 677, 679-80 (1990-91) (revealing several facts in Morton Salt that indicated that its 
leases did not substantially lessen competition: 
(a) the existence of alternatives to the patented machines; 
(b) Morton Salt’s [alleged infringer’s] identical tying provision; 
(c) the availability to Suppiger’s [patentee’s] lessees of competing machines 
and the lessees’ freedom to use any salt tablets they desired with those 
machines; 
(d) the small volume of salt used in the canning field in comparison to the salt 
business as a whole; 
(e) the fact that Suppiger’s [patentee’s machines] could be used for purposes 
other than depositing salt; and 
(f) the $30 annual rental per machine, which could not be called a sham or a 
coverage to monopolize the sale of unpatented salt.). 
(citing G.S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968, 971-72 (7th Cir. 1941). 
 55 See Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 201; Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 664; Morton Salt, 
117 F.2d at 968. 
 56 134 CONG. REC. S17, 146-02 (daily ed. October 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy)  (discussing S. 1200 and S. 438).  Patent misuse is a doctrine that could benefit 
from having a standing requirement that the misuse must directly effect the party raising 
the affirmative defense.  Historically, there has been no standing requirement.  This has 
caused substantial concern that the patent misuse doctrine is overbroad and overreaching.  
Id. 
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holder guilty of patent misuse.”57  The House, however, did not 
adopt this bill.  Instead, a compromise between the two houses was 
reached with Congress concentrating instead on preventing two 
categories of activity from being subject to patent misuse: (1) the 
refusal to use or license; and (2) the tying of a patented product to 
another separate product.58  Finally, in 1988, the PMRA was 
signed into law .59 
Codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5),60 the PMRA does not 
address when conduct falling outside the statute can amount to 
patent misuse without an antitrust violation.61  After PMRA’s 
passage, there has been a pervasive perception that patent misuse is 
“dead,”62 and has been replaced with the antitrust rule of reason 
analysis.63  The PMRA, however, only eliminates a finding of 
patent misuse, without showing market power in the relevant 
market, in two situations, not all circumstances.64  The Act states 
that a patentee: 
[O]therwise entitled to relief for direct or 
contributory infringement shall not be deemed 
guilty of patent misuse or illegal extension of the 
patent right by reason of his having . . . (5) 
conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or 
the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of 
a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a 
separate product, unless, in view of the 
circumstances, the patent owner has market power 
 
 57 134 CONG. REC. H10, 646-02 (daily ed. October 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. 
Kastenheimer) (discussing differences between S. 438 and the bill before the House). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-73 (102 Stat. 4674) (codified 
at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994)).  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (1994).  Subsections 4 and 
5 of 271(d) were added by § 201 of Public Law 100-703, the Patent and Trademark 
Authorization Act, approved Nov. 19 1988.  Subsection 4 relates to a patentee’s ability to 
refuse to license his or her patent without being deemed guilty of patent misuse.  For 
purposes of this Article, subsection 4 is not pertinent. 
 60 35 U.S. § 271 (d) (1994). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Farkas, supra note 54; see also Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708. 
 63 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708 (stating that the appropriate criterion for 
determining whether there is patent misuse, when a restriction reaches beyond the patent 
grant, is whether or not the restriction is justifiable under the rule of reason).  PSC Inc. v. 
Symbol Tech., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 505 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating alleged patent misuse 
must be evaluated in accordance with the rule of reason). 
 64 Cf., Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 218 (stating that “claims of anticompetitve 
patent misuse are best tested by the antitrust laws). 
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in the relevant market for the patent or patented 
product on which the license or sale is 
conditioned.65 
A. Tying Arrangements 
A primary reason for Congress making this change concerning 
tying arrangements was the belief that doing do would have a pro-
competitive effect in the market place.  Allowing patent holders to 
engage in certain licensing activity can promote competition and 
should be allowed in such circumstances.66  To better understand 
this point, it is necessary to examine the typical situation in which 
tying arrangements occur.  The basic logic of all tying cases is that 
the tying product is the product everyone wants, while the tied 
product is the product buyers are forced to purchase in order to 
receive the tying product.  An unlawful tying arrangement 
prohibited by the antitrust laws67 is established by showing: 
(1) there are separate products; (2) the purchase of 
one (the tying product) is conditioned on the 
purchase of the other (the tied product); (3) the 
 
 65 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (emphasis added). 
 66 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-15 (1984), noted in 
4 HARVARD J.L. & TECH. 1, 29-31. (discussing Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in 
which she stated “that a legal ‘monopoly’ such as a patent should not be presumed to 
create market power in the tying product”). 
 67 Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the 
course of such commerce, to make a sale or contract for sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other 
commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption 
or resale within the United States . . . on the condition, agreement, or 
understanding that the . . . purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in 
the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other 
commodities of a competitor or competitors of the . . . seller, where 
the effect of such . . . sale, or contract for sale or such condition, 
agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.   
15 U.S.C.§ 14 (1982). 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.  15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).  See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 23 
n.39 (stating that the standard of analysis is the same under the Clayton Act as the 
Sherman Act).  See Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: Blessed 
Be the Tie?,  4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26-27 (1991). 
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tying product’s market power appreciably restrains 
free competition in the tied product’s market; and 
(4) a “not insubstantial” amount of commerce in the 
tied product is affected.68 
When these elements are shown, the tying arrangement is per se 
illegal.69  Using the term, per se illegal is a misnomer, however, 
since market power in the relevant market must be shown in order 
to prove an antitrust violation.70  Market power has been defined as 
the power “to force a purchaser to do something that he would not 
do in a competitive market.”71  It is the ability of a single seller to 
raise prices and restrict output.72  In tying situations, market power 
is determined by whether or not the seller has the power “to raise 
prices, or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with 
respect to any appreciable number of buyers within the market.”73  
The anticompetitive effects in tying come from having economic 
leverage in the tying product.  This gives the seller the ability to 
force a buyer into either purchasing a tied product “that the buyer 
either did not want . . . or might have preferred to purchase 
elsewhere on different terms.”74 
On the other hand, when the tying and tied product are 
consumed in fixed proportions, the possibility of economic 
leverage in the tying product is absent because it is not possible to 
make a monopoly profit on the tied product.75  If the tied product is 
sold in fixed proportion to the tying product, generally only a 
competitive profit, and not a monopoly profit, is earned.  If, 
however, the tied product is not sold in fixed proportion to the 
tying product, a monopoly profit can be earned on the tied 
 
 68 Burchfiel, supra note 67, at 26-27 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11-18; Fortner Enters. v. United States 
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969) [hereinafter Fortner I]; Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc. 
852 F.2d 1280, 1282-83 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 69 Burchfiel, supra note 67, at 27. 
 70 Id. 
 71 504 U.S. at  464 (1992) (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14). 
 72 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) 
(citing Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 503). 
 73 Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 504.  See Burchfiel, supra note 67 at 28. 
 74 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.  See Burchfiel, supra note 67, at 28. 
 75 See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 
YALE L. J. 19, 21-23 (1957); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 
617 (1977) [hereinafter Fortner II] (citing Bowman supra for the proposition that 
economic leverage would not be possible because credit and prefabricated housing were 
sold in fixed proportions). 
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product.76 
For example, if a patent holder sells golf club woods as a tying 
product and sells irons as a tied product, the clubs are sold in fixed 
proportion to each other.  Presumably, there would be no need to 
buy irons more frequently than woods.  If, however, the golf balls 
are the tied products, they would not be sold in fixed proportion to 
the woods.  The amount of golf balls needed would have no 
correlative relationship to the amount of woods needed.  This way 
a seller is able to charge more to those who use the clubs more 
frequently, thus needing more golf balls, than those who use them 
less.77  Consequently, the seller obtains a monopoly profit on the 
golf balls.78  In a situation where the tying product is patented, 
extending the patent monopoly to an unpatented tied product 
excludes other sellers from the opportunity to sell to the patent 
holder’s customers.79 
Despite the possible anticompetitive effects of tying cases, 
Congress requires that market power in the relevant market be 
shown to find patent misuse.80  Making this change for tying 
arrangements allows patent holders to engage in certain licensing 
activities that can have pro-competitive effects.  Field of use 
restrictions are an example of a licensing activity having the 
potential to promote competition.   
A field of use restriction prohibits a licensee from realizing the 
benefits of the license in certain technical fields.81  For example, a 
license may restrict the use of a pharmaceutical to only veterinary 
applications, subjecting the licensee to liability if he or she uses the 
licensed pharmaceutical on humans or for any other non-veterinary 
application.82 
 
 76 See THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW 
AND ITS ORIGINS 331-32 (1994). 
 77 Id. at 332; see also Bowman, supra note 75, at 23. 
 78 Thomas D. Morgan, Remarks at a George Washington University Law School 
Antitrust Lecture (Feb. 23, 1995). 
 79 If, however, the tied product is patented, the patent holder would have a right to 
restrict its use.  35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).  This right to exclude is, in part, based on the fact 
that what is patented has contributed something new and nonobvious and has been 
disclosed to the public. 
 80 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 81 See 6-19 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 at 31-38 (2000). 
 82 Thomas C. Meyers, Field-of-Use Restrictions as Pro-competitive Elements in 
Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements in the United States and the European 
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Such pro-competitive effects, however, do not occur when a 
patentee restricts the sale of a patented invention to a single use, in 
cases where the use of such a device is not claimed as part of the 
patented invention.83  In these cases, single use restrictions have 
been masked as “field of use” restrictions.84  Field of use 
restrictions provide an important pro-competitive purpose since 
they allow patentees to license in different markets with varying 
market demand at commensurate royalty fees.85 
One of the most crucial circumstances that § 271(d)(5) does not 
address is when a product is sold with a “single use only” 
restriction.  A single use restriction is not a restriction based on the 
purchase of a separate product, and a second use of the same 
product is not a separate product.  It is not possible for a product 
having one physical substantiation to be a separate product. In a 
context where the use of a patented invention is not claimed, a 
single use restriction can create an excessive return on the patent.86   
When a single use restriction is employed, § 271(d)(5) is not 
immune to the application of patent misuse.87  A single use 
restriction on a patented product, where the use of the product is 
not patented does not meet the pro-competitive goals of use 
restrictions.  These situations are analogous to a purchaser buying 
golf clubs, but only being allowed to use them for one round of 
golf, even though there is plenty of life left in the clubs. Single use 
only restrictions allow the patentee to keep economic leverage and 
force a purchaser to buy another product when a new one is 
unnecessary. 
Given these anticompetitive effects, patent misuse should be 
applied in cases where the restriction on reuse is not made with 
respect to a separate product, and where the restriction forces the 
 
Communities, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 364, 366 (1991). 
 83 See CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 81, at 31-38. 
 84 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703. 
 85 See Meyers, supra note 82 at 367-69 (discussing how field of use restrictions 
encourage patentees to enter both high and low demand markets when the royalty fees 
can be charged commensurately with demand). 
 86 See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 491 (stating a “patent affords no immunity for a 
monopoly not within the grant); International Salt, 332 U.S. at 395-6 (stating a patent 
affords no antitrust immunity over unpatented salt); Aro Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., Inc., 365 U.S. 336, 339-340, 345 (1961) [hereinafter Aro I] 
(concluding that a patent did not confer a monopoly over an unpatented element of the 
combination). 
 87 Patent Misuse Reform Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5). 
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buyer to purchase something that need not be bought in fixed 
proportion to the patented device.  Accordingly, a “market power 
rule of reason” analysis is not required under § 271(d)(5) for single 
use restrictions where a second use of the sold product is not based 
on a purchase of a separate product.88 
A case illustrative of the situation described above is 
Mallinckrodt v. Medipart.89  In Mallinckrodt, the patentee, 
inscribed a “Single Use Only” restriction on its patented device90 
and the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in holding 
that the restriction on reuse was unenforceable under the patent 
law,91  stating that: 
If the sale of the [embodiment of the patented 
device] was validly conditioned under the 
applicable law such as the law governing sales and 
licenses, and if the restriction on reuse was within 
the original scope of the patent grant or otherwise 
justified, then violation of the restriction may be 
remedied by action for patent infringement.92 
In this case, Mallinckrodt owned a patent on an “apparatus for 
delivering radioactive and therapeutic material in aerosol mist form 
to the lungs of a patient.”93  This device was used for diagnosis and 
treatment of pulmonary disease.94  Mallinckrodt manufactured and 
sold this device to hospitals as a unitary kit, with a “Single Use 
Only” restriction notice inscribed on the device.95  Furthermore, 
the instructions dictated that the entire apparatus be disposed of in 
accordance with biohazardous waste procedures.96  Some 
 
 88 But see Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (stating “[w]hen a practice alleged to constitute patent misuse is neither per se 
patent misuse nor specifically excluded from a misuse analysis by 271(d), a court must 
determine if that practice is ‘reasonably within the patent grant.’”) (quoting Mallinckrodt, 
976 F.2d at 708)). 
 89 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 700. 
 90 Id. at 701. 
 91 Id.; see also Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1113, 1120-21 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (holding Mallinckrodt’s “Single Use Only” restriction is not enforceable by way of 
a suit for patent infringement). 
 92 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703. 
 93 Id. at 701. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 701-2. 
 96 Id. at 702.  Note that any health and safety concerns can be covered by limiting 
express and implied warranties of the patented product beyond a single use. 
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hospitals, however, did not dispose of the patented device as 
instructed or limit its use to a single use.97  Instead, they shipped 
the used patented devices to Medipart.98  Medipart then 
reconditioned the patented devices and sent them back to the 
respective hospitals.99  Consequently, Mallinckrodt sued Medipart 
for patent infringement and inducement to infringe.100  Both parties 
then moved for summary judgment.101 
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment finding that the violation of the single use restriction 
could not be remedied under patent law.102  Instead, the trial court 
said that this was a case of patent exhaustion, a doctrine stating 
that after sale, title passes, and that once the “patent owner has 
received the consideration he is due . . . his rights to control the 
future use of his invention come to an end.”103 The court then 
granted defendants motion, “holding that the ‘Single Use Only’ 
restriction could not be enforced by suit for patent 
infringement.”104  In other words, even if the notice restriction was 
sufficient as a conditional sale, violation of that condition could 
not be remedied under patent law.105 
Mallinckrodt, on appeal, argued that its restriction on single use 
was merely a specified field of use restriction, wherein the field is 
a single (i.e. disposable) use.106  As such, Mallinckrodt contended 
that this restriction did not enlarge the original scope of its 
patent.107  In addition, Mallinckrodt argued that the “Single Use 
Only” restriction was reasonable because it was made for health 
and safety reasons and violated no public policy.108  Mallinckrodt 
therefore concluded that its restriction should be a valid and 
 
 97 Id. 
 98 Mallincrodt, 976 F.2d at 702. 
 99 Id.  These reconditioned units still bore the Mallinckrodt trademarks and the 
“Single Use Only” restriction.  The units were also not tested for residual biological 
activity or for radioactivity.  Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 701. 
 102 Mallinckrodt, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1120-21. 
 103 See id. at 1114 (citing Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873)). 
 104 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700. 
 105 Id. at 703. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. (arguing that “a single patient use is valid and enforceable under the patent law 
because the use is within the scope of the patent grant, and the restriction does not 
enlarge the patent grant”). 
 108 Mallinckrodt, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1120-21. 
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enforceable restriction under patent law.109 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that if a patentee’s “Single 
Use Only” restriction was a valid condition of sale and did not per 
se violate the doctrine of patent misuse or antitrust law, provided 
that no other law prevented enforcement of the patent.110  The 
court reasoned that the appropriate criterion was to determine 
whether Mallinckrodt’s restriction was “reasonably within the 
patent grant, or whether the patentee has ventured beyond the 
patent grant and into behavior having an anticompetitive effect not 
justifiable under the rule of reason.”111  Furthermore, the court held 
that if the single use restriction was valid, then “even repair of an 
unlicensed device constitutes infringement.”112 
The single use only restriction in Mallinckrodt does not fall 
within § 271(d)(5).  Here, Mallinckrodt did not tie the sale of the 
patented product to the purchase of “a separate product.”113  
Instead, Mallinckrodt tied the sale of the patented product to a 
single use of the patented product.114  The uses are being sold in 
fixed proportion to the purchase of the patented product, even 
though the product has a life span beyond one use.115  
Consequently, such a reuse restriction goes beyond the patent 
grant.  Because this is not a tying case, market power in the tying 
product under the rule of reason is not required in evaluating it. 
 
The Federal Circuit noted that Mallinckrodt was not a tying 
case,116 however the court may have been influenced by § 
271(d)(5) in deciding this case.  The court noted that the rule of 
reason was the appropriate criterion for determining whether 
 
 109 Mallincrodt, 976 F.2d at 702. 
 110 Id. at 708. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 709 (referring to Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 
U.S. 476, 480 (1964) [hereinafter Aro II].  This reference, however, is somewhat 
misplaced.  Here, the Court was talking about direct infringement existing because Ford 
did not have a license to make the convertible tops.  The fact that defendant, Aro, made 
the repairs should not be any more of an infringement based on Ford’s actions. 
 113 Id. at 709.  In other words, if a purchaser bought the mist to refill the patented 
invention, this refilling would not violate the restriction.  It is only the use of the refilled 
invention that would exceed the limitation. 
 114 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708. 
 115 See id. 
 116 Id. at 708 (emphasizing that this case was not a price-fixing or tying case, and the 
per se antitrust and misuse violations should not be applied). 
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Mallinckrodt’s single use restriction was justifiably within the 
patent grant or had ventured “into behavior having anticompetitive 
effect.”117  In actuality, § 271(d)(5) does not address this situation, 
as the single use restriction was not placed on a separate 
product.118  The broader question is whether there can be a single 
use restriction characterized as a specific field of use that is not 
patent misuse. 
Following Mallinckrodt, single use restriction cases have been 
decided under legal doctrines that do not address the pro-
competitive issues Congress attempted to stimulate in the 
PMRA.119  Post-Mallinckrodt cases have been decided using the 
permissible repair versus impermissible reconstruction doctrine.120  
Under this doctrine, a patent on a combination of elements “covers 
only the totality of the elements in the claim and . . . no element, 
separately viewed, is within the grant.”121  As the Supreme Court 
has stated: 
No element, not itself separately patented, that 
constitutes one of the elements of a combination 
patent is entitled to patent monopoly, however 
essential it may be to the patented combination and 
no matter how costly or difficult replacement may 
be.122 
A purchaser of a patented invention is entitled to replace non-
patented “spent” parts that amount to permissible repair.123  The 
 
 117 See id.; 35 U.S.C. §271(d)(5) (1994). 
 118 There was a bill in the Senate, S.1200, that would have limited the patent misuse 
defense to cases in which an antitrust violation existed, but this was not adopted.  See 134 
CONG. REC. S14,434-03 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 134 CONG. 
REC. H10,646-02 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenheimer); 134 CONG. 
REC. S17,146-02 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy).  Thus, the patent 
misuse doctrine should only be limited as much as Congress intended to limit it.  See In 
re Recombinant DNA, 850 F.Supp.769, 774 (S.D. Ind. 1994). 
 119 See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also 
Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, 165 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Image 
Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); see also B. 
Braun Med. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Zeneca, Ltd. v. 
Pharmachemie B.V., 37 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 120 See, e.g., supra note 119. 
 121 Aro I, 365 U.S. at 344. 
 122 Id. at 345. 
 123 Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100, 102 (1923) (asserting that the 
patented machine lasts indefinitely, while the bands are exhausted after a limited use and 
must be replaced); see also Aro I, 365 U.S. at 345 (holding that the “[m]ere replacement 
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term “spent” refers to the idea that the replacement parts have 
reached their life span, or have worn out;124 however, the purchaser 
may not impermissibly reconstruct the patented device.125 
Patent monopoly is ‘exhausted’ by the first authorized sale of the 
 
of individual unpatented parts, one at a time, whether of the same part repeatedly or 
different parts successively, is no more than the lawful right of the owner to [permissibly] 
repair his property.”); see also Kendall Co. v. Progressive Med. Tech., 85 F.3d 1570, 
1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that the “‘use of the whole’ of the combination which a 
purchaser buys, and [replacement of worn-out parts] is but an exercise of the right ‘to 
give duration to that which he owns’”); see also Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., 45 
F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reasoning that permissible repair encompasses any 
repair necessary for maintaining the use of the whole of the patented combination 
through replacing a spent part); see also Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875 F.2d 300 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989) (agreeing with defendant that replacing a worn or spent part in a patented 
combination constitutes [permissible] repair and not reconstruction). 
 124 See Everpure, 875 F.2d 300. 
 125 Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109, 123 (Mem) (1850) (stating “when the material of 
the [patented] combination ceases to exist . . . the right to renew it depends upon the right 
to make the invention.  If [that] right does not exist, there is no right to [reconstruct the 
invention]”).  See also American Cotton-Tie v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882) (explaining 
why the defendants did not make a permissible repair, but an impermissible 
reconstruction.) 
What the defendants did in piecing together the pieces of the old band 
was not a repair of the band or the tie, in any proper sense.  The band 
was voluntarily severed by the consumer at the cotton-mill because 
the tie had performed its function of confining the bale of cotton in its 
transit from the plantation or the press to the mill.  Its capacity for use 
as a tie was voluntarily destroyed.  As it left the bale it could not be 
used again as a tie.  As a tie the defendants reconstructed it, although 
they used the old buckle without repairing that.  The case is not like 
putting new cutters into a planing-machine, as in Wilson v. Simpson, 
9 How. 109, in place of cutters worn out by use.  The principle of that 
case was that temporary parts wearing out in a machine might be 
replaced to preserve the machine in accordance with the intention of 
the vendor, without amounting to a reconstruction of the machine. 
Id. 
See also Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining 
an example regarding an impermissible reconstruction.) 
Moreover, the nature of the work done by E.J. shows that retipping is 
more like reconstruction than like repair.  E.J. does not just attach a 
new part for a worn part, but rather must go through several steps to 
replace, configure and integrate the tip onto the shank.  It has to break 
the worn or damaged tip from the shank by heating it to 1300 degrees 
Fahrenheit.  It brazes to the shank a new rectangular block of carbide 
and grinds and machines it to the proper diameter and creates the 
point.  Thereafter, the tip is honed and sharpened, grinding the rake 
surfaces and the center of the point and honing the edges.  These 
actions are effectively a re-creation of the patented invention after it 
is spent. 
Id. 
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patented item, and patent law does not protect attempts by the 
patentee or his licensees to control use of the product after such 
sale.126  Permissible repair is normally confined to repairing spent 
(i.e., worn or broken) parts while impermissible reconstruction is 
limited to situations where the entity, viewed as a whole, has 
become spent.127 
The post-Mallinckrodt single use only restriction cases, which 
have been decided on the basis of the repair versus reconstruction 
doctrine, have expanded what constitutes “spent,” while the 
category unpatented components which have reached the end of 
their lifespan, has broadened.128  Permissible repairs now include 
the replacement of unworn or even unused components of a 
patented combination.129  Such expansion is confusing and does 
 
 126 See Hensley, 383 F. 2d at 263 (citing United States v. Univis Lens. Co., 316 U.S. 
241 (1942).  See also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 
502 (1917),  overruling Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). 
 127 Aro I, 365 U.S. at 342-43 (1961) (stating: “[I]t is ‘the use of the whole’ of the 
combination which a purchaser buys, and . . . repair or replacement of the worn-out, 
damaged or destroyed part is but an exercise of the right ‘to give duration to that which 
he owns, or has a right to use as a whole.’”) 
(quoting Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 123 (1850)). 
Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 641, 648 (N.D. Ill.) (stating 
“[u]nder [the repair doctrine], a customer may replace or repair worn or broken 
unpatented parts of a patented combination”), aff’d Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. 
Corp., 41 F.3d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 128 See Gajarsa supra note 28. 
 129 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., Inc., 123 F.3d 1445, 
1452 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding permissible repair where the parts were completely unused 
and unworn, while noting that the modifications were not conventional repair.) 
While there is no bright-line test for determining whether a 
modification is a “reconstruction” sufficient to infringe a patent 
owned by the seller of the product, on the undisputed facts in this 
case, we agree with the district court that [defendant, ROT] has not 
reconstructed the cartridges.  ROT’s modification of the caps of HP’s 
cartridges is more akin to permissible “repair” than to impermissible 
“reconstruction”. 
Id.; see also Kendall Co., 85 F.3d at 1576 (stating that [i]n sum, although the pressure 
sleeves were not physically worn-out, they were effectively spent because of the risk of 
contamination between successive patients.  Replacement of the sleeves after each use 
was necessary, as a practical matter, for Kendall’s customers to continue to use the 
complete [patented system]); Sage, 45 F.3d at 1578. 
It might be prudent to replace an expendable element before it has 
been completely exhausted . . . .  This court has never said that an 
element is spent only when it is impossible to reuse it.  Like the 
district court, we believe that when it is neither practical nor feasible 
to continue using an element that is intended to be replaced, that 
element is effectively spent. 
Id. (citing Everpure, 875 F.2d at 303). 
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not address Congress’ intent for restrictions to stimulate 
competition for patented inventions. 
Another drawback of analyzing single use only restriction cases 
under the permissible repair versus impermissible reconstruction 
doctrine is that the courts are forced to look to the intent of the 
patentee.130  This is often precarious since it is difficult to prove 
the subjective intent of the patentee.  In addition, intent should not 
be an element in a judicial test for direct infringement as 
knowledge of infringement is not a required element in 35 U.S.C. § 
271 (a).131  There are also severe inconsistencies in the existing 
repair versus reconstruction jurisprudence.132 
 
 130 Wilson, 50 U.S. at 125-26 (focusing on what the inventor contemplated regarding 
whether knives used in the patented machine would be replaced during the life of the 
machine.) 
The right . . . to replace the cutter-knives is not because they are 
perishable materials, but because the inventor of the machine has so 
arranged them as a part of its combination, that the machine could not 
be continued in use without a succession of knives at short intervals.  
Unless they were replaced, the invention would have been of little 
use to the inventor or to others . . . .  These, without having a definite 
duration are contemplated by the inventor to last so long as the 
materials of which they are formed can hold together in use in such a 
combination . . . .  With such intentions, they are put into the 
structure . . . .  [The] inventor cannot complain, if he sells the use of 
his machine, that the purchaser uses it in the way the inventor meant 
it to be used . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Morgan, 152 U.S. at 434 (finding that replacing the toilet 
paper on a patented toilet paper roll was not impermissible reconstruction because: the 
purchaser of a new [toilet paper] roll does precisely what the patentee intended he should 
do; he replaces that which is in its nature perishable and without the replacement of 
which the remainder of the device is of no value); Sandvik Aktiebolag, 121 F.3d at 674 
(finding that the evidence shows that plaintiff “never intended for its drills to be retipped.  
It did not manufacture or sell replacement drill tips.  It did not publish instructions on 
how to retip or suggest [such]”). 
 131 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).  “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever invents 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell or sells any patented invention, within the 
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of 
the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”  Id.; see also Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’g 
Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J. concurring) (stating that the patent 
act leaves no room for deminimus or experimental use excuses for infringement because 
intent is irrelevant to patent infringement so that an experimental use excuse cannot 
survive).  Note, however, that intent is an element of active inducement infringement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and contributory infringement under § 271(c). 
 132 See Gajarsa, supra note 28 at 1207-08. 
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B.  Exhaustion 
In addition to limiting patent misuse, Mallinckrodt put 
substantial restraints on the doctrine of patent exhaustion.  In the 
seminal case on patent exhaustion, Adams v. Burke,133 the Supreme 
Court held that a patent right is “exhausted” by the first sale of the 
patented product.134  Thus, any attempt to restrict the use of such 
patented product, after it has passed into the stream of commerce, 
is unenforceable under patent laws.135 This case was resolved 
under patent law without any antitrust discussion, as the case was 
decided prior to the Sherman Act. 
Today, the “antitrust analogue to the [exhaustion doctrine] is the 
doctrine of ‘restraints on alienation,’ utilized by the Supreme Court 
in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.”136  In Arnold, Schwinn, 
the Court held that any restriction by a seller of a product with 
respect to the resale of that product is per se illegal under the 
antitrust laws.137 The Court, however, evaluated products where 
the manufacturer retained title under the rule of reason.138  Arnold, 
Schwinn was overruled in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc.139 
In Continental T.V., the Court held that “vertical restrictions 
 
 133 84 U.S. 453 (1873). 
 134 See id.; see also Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895).  When 
a patentee sells a patented article of manufacture, the Court said: 
[I]t is obvious that a purchaser can use the article in any part of the 
United States, and, unless restrained by contract with the patentee, 
can sell or dispose of the same.  It has passed outside of the 
monopoly, and is no longer under the peculiar protection granted to 
patented rights.   
Id. at 663. 
 135 84 U.S. at 456. 
 136 Weinschel and Stefanski, supra note 2 at 19 (quoting United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
 137 Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379. 
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a 
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with 
whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with 
dominion over it . . . .  Such restraints are so obviously destructive of 
competition that their mere existence is enough.  If the manufacturer 
parts with dominion over his product or transfers risk of loss to 
another, he may not reserve control over its destiny or the conditions 
of its resale. 
Id. 
 138 Id. at 379-80. 
 139 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
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promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to 
achieve efficiencies in the distribution.”140  These restrictions 
allow sellers to regulate the amount of competition among their 
retailers through territorial restrictions, increasing interbrand 
competition.141  Thus, the Court held these restrictions should be 
evaluated under the rule of reason.142  In particular, the Court noted 
that there should be no distinction drawn between sale and non-
sale transactions,143 the rule of reason should be applied in both 
situations.144 
The question then becomes: Is Adams in conflict with 
Continental T.V.?145 Technically, Adams makes restraints on 
patented products after sale unenforceable under patent law.146  It 
could be viewed that the exhaustion doctrine merely places 
patented products on an equal footing with unpatented products 
when analyzing a licensor’s right to place restrictions on the 
purchaser of the product under the antitrust laws.147  Following this 
logic, the Federal Circuit, in Mallinckrodt, supported this 
contention and rejected the doctrine of exhaustion as a basis for 
antitrust liability and patent misuse.148 
A further problem with Mallinckrodt is that it blurs the 
distinction between contracting for a sale of goods and contracting 
for patent rights.  There are different consequences when 
contracting for a sale of goods versus contracting for patent rights.  
Restrictions on patent rights travel downstream, while restrictions 
on contracts do not.  In other words, a patent owner may limit 
rights granted under a patent license agreement to those not in 
 
 140 Id. at 55. 
 141 See id. 
 142 See id. 
 143 Id. at 57 (holding “that the distinction drawn in Schwinn between sale and nonsale 
transactions is not sufficient to justify the application of a per se rule in one situation and 
a rule of reason in the other . . . .  Accordingly, we conclude that the per se rule stated in 
Schwinn must be overruled.”). 
 144 See id. 
 145 Weinschel and Stefanski, supra note 2 at 19.  In Schwinn, at footnote 6, the Court 
specifically excludes this analysis from applying to a patentee: “We have no occasion 
here to consider whether a patentee has any greater rights in this respect.” 388 U.S. at 380 
(citations omitted). 
 146 84 U.S. at 457 (holding that purchaser “acquire[s] the right to this use of it [the 
patented device] freed from any claim of the patentee”). 
 147 Weinschel and Stefanski, supra note 2 at 19. 
 148 976 F.2d at 708. 
WHITE.PP6 9/6/01  10:40 PM 
694 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:671 
 
privity of contract.149  If a sale is not authorized, it may result in an 
infringement.150  An authorized sale of a patented product, 
however, places the product beyond the reach of the patent, 
exhausting the patent rights.151  In contrast, a patent owner may 
place conditions on a sale of a patented product through contract, 
but such restrictions should apply only to those in privity of 
contract.152  Generally, only those who are in privity of contract, 
with the exception of intended beneficiaries,153 may sue on a 
contract.154  The idea is that one who is not in privity of contract 
cannot be sued on such contract; therefore, one not in privity 
should not be able to sue on such contract either.155 
Although the courts have not thoroughly discussed the impact of 
determining whether a given contract covers a sale of goods or a 
license of intellectual property rights, the courts have tangentially 
examined this distinction.  In both Wilson v. Rousseau156 and 
Bloomer v. McQuewan,157 those who had purchased patented 
 
 149 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(1).  A patentee has: 
[T]he right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the 
invention into the United States, and if the invention is a process, of 
the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling 
throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, 
products made by that process, referring to the specification for the 
particulars thereof. 
Id.; McCoy v. Mitsubishi, 67 F.3d 917, 919 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (recognizing that a “patent 
confers the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling what is described in its 
claims.”) 
 150 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994). 
 151 Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(emphasizing that patent exhaustion applies similarly to a sale of a patented product 
manufactured by a licensee acting within the scope of its license). 
 152 VERNON V. PALMER, THE PATHS TO PRIVITY: THE HISTORY OF THIRD PARTY 
BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS AT ENGLISH LAW 853 (1992) (discussing the traditional rule 
that “only a person who is a privity to a contract can sue on it).  An exception to this rule 
is for intended beneficiaries who may sue on a contract that was made directly for their 
benefit.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1977). 
 153 An exception to this principle has been made for third party intended beneficiaries.  
See Seavor v. Ransom, 120 N.E. 639, 641 (1918); Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 274 
(1859) (holding that one not in privity of contract, but who is an intended beneficiary on 
the contract, may sue on such contract for breach). 
 154 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.  There are situations in which a person 
not in privity may have rights to sue on a contract, like a third party beneficiary or an 
aggrieved buyer trying to sue a manufacturer on its warranty.  Contrary to Mallinckrodt, 
in these cases, the third parties are not being sued by a party to the contract. 
 155 See Seavor, 120 N.E. at 640. 
 156 45 U.S. 646 (1846). 
 157 55 U.S. 539 (Mem), 14 How. 539 (1852). 
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machines during the patent’s original term were held to have the 
right to continue using such machines after the patent term had 
been renewed twice, without paying a second royalty.158  In its 
opinions the Court made a distinction “between the grant of the 
right to make and vend the machine, and the grant of the right to 
 
 158 There is no longer a provision for extension of patent term.  In 1836, however, 
Congress passed an act allowing for such extension: 
And be it further enacted, that whenever any patentee of an invention 
or discovery shall desire an extension of his patent beyond the term 
of its limitation, he may make application therefore, in writing, to the 
Commissioner of the Patent Office, setting forth the grounds thereof; 
and the Commissioner shall, on the applicant’s paying the sum of 
forty dollars to the credit of the treasury, as in the case of an original 
application for a patent, cause to be published in one or more of the 
principal newspapers in the city of Washington, and in such other 
paper or papers as he may deem proper, published in the section of 
country most interested adversely to the extension of the patent, a 
notice of such application, and of the time and place when and where 
the same will be considered, that any person may appear and show 
cause why the extension should not be granted. And the Secretary of 
State, the Commissioner of the Patent Office, and the Solicitor of the 
Treasury shall constitute a board to hear and decide upon the 
evidence produced before them, both for and against the extension, 
and shall sit for that purpose at the time and place designated in the 
published notice thereof. The patentee shall furnish to the said board 
a statement in writing, under oath, of the ascertained value of the 
invention, and of his receipts and expenditures, sufficiently in detail 
to exhibit a true and faithful account of loss and profit in any manner 
accruing to him from and by reason of said invention. And if, upon a 
hearing of the matter, it shall appear to the full and entire satisfaction 
of said board, having due regard to the public interest therein, that it 
is just and proper that the term of the patent should be extended, by 
reason of the patentee, without neglect or fault upon his part, having 
failed to obtain, from the use and sale of his invention, a reasonable 
remuneration for the time, ingenuity, and expense bestowed upon the 
same, and the introduction thereof into use, it shall be the duty of the 
Commissioner to renew and extend the patent, by making a 
certificate thereon of such extension, for the term of seven years from 
and after the expiration of the term; which certificate, with a 
certificate of said board of their judgment and opinion as aforesaid, 
shall be entered on record in the patent-office; and thereupon the said 
patent shall have the same effect in law as though it had been 
originally granted for the term of twenty-one years. And the benefit 
of such renewal shall extend to assignees and grantees of the right to 
use the thing patented, to the extent of their respective interest 
therein. Provided, however, that no extension of a patent shall be 
granted after the expiration of the term for which it was originally 
issued. 
6 Stat. at Large, 678.  Act approved 4th July, 1836, ch. 357.  See Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 
U.S. 646, 658 (1846). 
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use it.”159  The Court also stated that when a patentee sells the 
exclusive privilege of making or vending the patented invention 
for use in a particular place, “the purchaser buys a portion of the 
franchise which the patent confers.  The patentee cannot sell [the 
exclusive rights] for a longer time.  And the purchaser buys with 
reference to that [limited] period.”160   
But when a purchaser buys the patented invention itself, the 
purpose of using it stands on different ground.  “In using it, he 
exercises no rights . . .[granted] by Congress nor does [the title 
come from] the . . . exclusive privilege granted to the patentee.”161  
When the machine passes to the purchaser, it no longer lies within 
the limits of the monopoly.162  “It passes outside of it.”163  Thus, 
the patented invention becomes the individual property of the 
purchaser, it is individual property, no longer protected by federal 
laws, but by the laws of the State in which the property lies.164  The 
right is expended under what is called the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion. 
II.  THE PROPOSED TEST 
Several cases have been heard at the Federal Circuit where 
single use restrictions were placed on patented devices.165  In some 
of these cases, the outcome would have changed or the questions 
asked would have been different if the test proposed in this article 
was used.  In particular, Mallinckrodt166 would have had a different 
outcome.  In that case, the Federal Circuit held that if a patentee’s 
“single use only” restriction was a valid condition of sale, this 
restriction is not excluded from enforcement under patent law.167  
Such a restriction does not “per se violate the doctrine of patent 
misuse or the antitrust law, provided that no other law prevents 
 
 159 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 548 (1852). 
 160 Id. at 549. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 549-50 (discussing that the purchasers derive no advantage for the patentee’s 
patent extension). 
 165 See Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed Cir. 1997); Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 
F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997); The Kendall Co. v. Progressive Med. Tech., Inc., 85 F.3d 1570 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 166 976 F.2d 700 (1992). 
 167 Id. at 701. 
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enforcement of the patent.”168   
The proposed test requires that the doctrine of per se patent 
misuse be applied in cases where: (1) a reuse restriction is not 
made with respect to a separate product; and  (2) where the 
restriction forces the buyer to purchase something that need not be 
bought in fixed proportion to the patented device, since the life-
span of the device outlasts the single use.  Because the single use 
restriction in Mallinckrodt was not a restriction on a separate 
product, the first prong of the test is met.  Secondly, the second 
prong is satisfied because the single use restriction on the patented 
devices forces the buyer into purchasing more uses than is 
necessary since the general life-span of the patented devices 
outlasts a single use.  Thus, such a restriction should be considered 
a per se patent misuse violation.  After Mallinckrodt, single use 
restrictions no longer amounted to per se patent misuse.169  
Consequently, most cases were argued under other theories.170 
Another case where the patent holder utilized a single use 
restriction is Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus,171 a post-Mallinckrodt 
case where the issue of patent misuse was not raised.  Instead, the 
court’s decision rested on the permissible repair doctrine.172  In 
Sage Prods., the court focused on the patent holder’s intent 
regarding the single use and whether the replaced part was 
“spent.”173 
Sage Products (“Sage”) was the assignee to Reissue Patent No. 
33,413 (the “‘413 patent”) having claims drawn to a disposal 
system for contaminated items, particularly those used in a 
hospital.174  The “413 patent” comprised an “outer enclosure” that 
could be mounted on a wall, and a cooperating, “removable inner 
 
 168 Id. at 702. 
 169 See, e.g., B. Braun Med. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(ruling that district court erred in instructing jury that use restrictions amounted to patent 
misuse without an evaluation under the rule of reason). 
 170 See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard, 123 F. 3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that 
defendant’s modification of Hewlett-Packard’s patented ink cartridge was a non- 
infringing permissible repair). 
 171 45 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 172 Id. at 1577 (where plaintiff “alleges that hospitals which replace the removable 
inner containers of its patented combination with Devon’s containers are impermissibly 
reconstructing the” plaintiff’s patented device). 
 173 Id. at 1578. 
 174 Id. at 1577. 
WHITE.PP6 9/6/01  10:40 PM 
698 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:671 
 
container.”175  The inner container was placed inside the outer 
enclosure.176 “The removable inner container [was] an unpatented 
element of the ‘413 combination.”177  When the inner container 
was full with contaminated items, it was removed from the outer 
enclosure, and preferably discarded.178  Sage marked a 
“BIOHAZARD – SINGLE USE ONLY” warning on the 
containers, the idea being that a single use corresponded to a full 
inner container.179  Sage’s sales literature also instructed customers 
to discard the inner containers once they were full to comply with 
the single use restriction.180 
In addition to selling the disposal system as a unit, Sage also 
sold replacement inner containers.181  Sage sold far more inner 
containers than combinations of inner containers and outer 
enclosures.182  Sale of inner containers is a sizeable market.183 
Although the “‘413 patent discourag[ed] reuse, it [was] 
physically possible to empty, clean, and reuse the commercial 
embodiment of the inner container.”184  This, however, was 
difficult and could damage to the inner container.185  Nevertheless, 
the inner containers were sometimes reused and Sage, 
subsequently, refused to sell directly to buyers that reused the 
containers.186 
 
Devon, the defendant, manufactured and sold an inner container 
that could be used with a wall bracket made by either Devon or by 
 
 175 45 F.3d at 1576 (citing the language from the claims in the patent at issue). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 1577 (noting that “[t]he specification states that the inner container is 
intended to be disposable and is preferably discarded when full . . . .  Proper disposal, 
such as incineration, of filled inner containers prevents improper reuse of, and possible 
contamination or spread of disease.”). 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. (noting that “Sage actively campaigns against reuse of inner containers and has 
even refused to sell directly to buyers which reuse the containers”). 
 181 Sage, 45 F.3d 1575. 
 182 Id. (attributing the discrepancy in sales to the fact that “outer enclosures could last 
indefinitely under normal use”). 
 183 Id. (noting that “Sage claims that its disposal systems are sold at over half of the 
hospitals in the United States”). 
 184 Id. at 1577. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id; see also supra note 180. 
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Sage.187  Devon did not manufacture an outer enclosure that, 
together with Devon’s inner container, would have infringed the 
‘413 patent.188 
Sage sued Devon, alleging that the hospitals directly infringed 
the ‘413 patent by using Devon replacement containers with 
Sage’s outer enclosure.189  Sage argued that the replacement 
impermissibly reconstructed the ‘413 patented combination, 
meaning Devon either actively induced infringement or was a 
contributory infringer.190  Sage contended that any entity that made 
the inner container infringed the patent, even though the inner 
container was an unpatented element of a combination.191  To 
avoid being liable as an infringer, Devon alleged that replacing the 
inner container was permissible repair.192 
At trial, the court granted Devon’s motion for partial summary 
judgment holding that replacing the inner containers was 
permissible repair.193  Sage appealed.  The dispute on appeal was 
whether or not undamaged, filled, inner containers were considered 
“spent,” so that that their replacement was considered permissible 
repair.194  Sage conceded that replacing a damaged container 
would be permissible repair.195  According to Sage, that was not 
the case because the replaced containers were not “spent,” used up, 
or in need of repair.196 In order to determine whether or not the 
replaced containers were spent, the court looked to Sage’s 
intent.197  This analysis is confusing because determining a 
patentee’s intent and whether the device is “spent” should be 
independent from one another.198 
 
 187 Sage, 45 F.3d 1575. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 1578. 
 193 Sage, 45 F.3d at 1577.  “[T]he district court held that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact about whether the inner container was a disposable element of the patented 
combination, and that replacing the container constituted permissible repair of the Sage 
system.”  Id. 
 194 Id. at 1578. 
 195 Id. “Sage does not suggest that replacing a damaged inner container is 
reconstruction.”  Id. 
 196 Id. at 1578. 
 197 Id. (relying on “Sage’s marketing of its sharps disposal units” to reject the 
argument that the “inner containers could be reused”). 
 198 Sage, 45 F.3d at 1578.  Here, the court determined that Sage’s intent determines 
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First, the court noted that Sage labeled the inner containers 
“SINGLE USE ONLY,” meaning Sage intended the containers to 
be discarded when full.199  Furthermore, “Sage admitted that it 
intended that its customers not reuse its containers and [had] 
refused to deal directly with distributors and users who [did].”200  
The court then concluded that an article is effectively spent “when 
it is neither practical nor feasible to continue using an element that 
is intended to be replaced.”201  The court affirmed the trial court’s 
summary judgment grant, finding that the defendants engaged in 
permissible repair and did not contributorily infringe the subject 
patent.202 
The courts’ choice to focus on Sage’s intent is problematic since 
the court said that it would have come out differently had it been 
practical to continue to use the inner container.203  Sage argued that 
the patent claimed a “removable” inner container, and not a 
“disposable” one.204  In the future, Sage proposed, there may be a 
way to safely dispose of the waste, without discarding the inner 
container along with the waste.205  The court went so far as to 
admit that it might have decided the case differently had this been 
the case: 
If those were the facts, our conclusion that this is 
permissible repair might be different . . . . But here, 
following the teaching of the ‘413 patent, Sage 
commercialized a unit designed for safe removal 
and disposal of hazardous waste.  It intended that its 
customers dispose of inner containers and went to 
great lengths to ensure that they did.206 
The problem with using the permissible repair versus 
impermissible reconstruction analysis is that it yields different 
 
whether or not the inner container is spent. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 1577. 
 201 Id. at 1578 (citing Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875 F.2d 300, 303). 
 202 Id. at 1579. 
 203 Id.  (citing FMC Corp. v. Up-Right Inc., 21 F.3d 1073, 1078-79 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 204 Sage, 45 F.3d at 1579; see U.S. Patent No. 4,715,498 (reissue no. 33,413) (issued 
Dec. 29, 1987).  Claim 1d., the patent-in-suit, describing the inner container as: “A 
disposal system comprising . . . a removable inner container disposed within said outer 
enclosure, said inner container including an inlet in registration with . . . .”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 205 Sage, 45 F.3d 1575. 
 206 Id. at 1579. 
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results depending on whether the thing intended to be replaced is 
considered “spent.”  Thus, the court might have found that reusing 
the inner container, if it was not considered spent, would have 
amounted to impermissible reconstruction, triggering patent 
infringement without looking at anticompetitive effect.  The more 
important focus rests on whether the anticompetitive restriction on 
reuse expands the patent’s original scope as to effect misuse of the 
patent. 
In Sage Prods., the court was troubled by Sage’s attempt to 
hold Devon liable for infringement for supplying an unpatented 
element that Sage, itself, recommended replacing:207  “[Sage] thus 
seeks to keep for itself a market in parts which are intended to be 
periodically replaced — this is no more than an attempt to expand 
patent rights to an unpatented product.”208 
The problem was not Sage’s intent regarding how often a part 
was to be replaced.  Rather, it was that Sage was trying to expand 
its monopoly coverage to the inner container, an unpatented 
element not privy to exclusive rights coverage under the patent.209  
The proposed test focuses on this issue.210  In applying the 
proposed test, per se patent misuse should be triggered. The 
proposed test requires that the doctrine of per se patent misuse 
should be applied in cases where: (1) a reuse restriction is not 
made with respect to a separate product; and  (2) where the 
restriction forces the buyer to purchase something that need not be 
bought in fixed proportion to the patented device, since the life-
span of the device outlasts the single use.  
First, the restriction is not made with respect to a separate 
product.  According to the restriction, the entire patented device 
can be used only until the inner container is full.211  Consequently, 
this restriction is on the entire device and not tied to a separate 
product.  In fact, replacing the container with a Sage inner 
container would technically infringe.  If this occurred, however, 
Sage would probably still sue because its goal in this litigation was 
to eliminate its competition so that it might sell all of the 
replacement containers, where it makes its largest profit margin.  
 
 207 Id. at 1579. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 See discussion infra Part II. 
 211 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702. 
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Second, the “SINGLE USE ONLY” restriction forces the buyer to 
purchase something that need not be bought in fixed proportion to 
the patented device’s further uses.  This is like Mallinckrodt, where 
any use beyond a single use was prohibited.212 
Notice that Sage was not suing its customers, the hospitals, but 
instead chose to sue a competitor that made replacement inner 
containers.213  Sage wanted to supply replacement inner containers 
and keep the competition from taking away this business.  Under 
the Act, Sage is permitted to tie sales of the inner containers to the 
tying product, the patented device, “unless, in view of the 
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant 
market for the patent or patented product on which the . . . sale is 
conditioned.214  In this case, Sage probably did have market power 
in the relevant market since Sage sold to over half of the hospitals 
in the United States.215  Under the rule of reason, Sage would 
probably have to sell the replacement containers at a competitive 
price to avoid an antitrust violation.216  Instead of characterizing 
the transaction as a tying arrangement, Sage avoided this by 
placing a single use restriction on its device.217 
In another case, Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical Tech.,218 the 
patentee placed a single use restriction on an unpatented element of 
a patented device.  In this case, Kendall, the assignee of U.S. 
Patent No. 4,253,449 (“‘449 patent”) drawn to a medical device for 
applying compressive pressure to a patient’s limb in order to 
increase blood flow.219 The patent is a combination patent having 
three components: a pump, a pair of pressurized sleeves; and 
connecting tubes.220 
Kendall sold an embodiment of an invention, called the SCD 
system, to health facilities.221  Included in the SCD System was a 
pump, a tubing assembly, and a plurality of sleeves.222  In order to 
 
 212 See Sage, 45 F.3d at 1577. 
 213 See id. 
 214 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1994). 
 215 See Sage, 45 F.3d at 1577. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 85 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 219 Id. at 1571. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at 1572. 
 222 Id. at 1571.  “The patented device is comprised of three basic components: a 
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discourage reuse of the pressure sleeves on the device, Kendall 
placed a notice on the sleeve packaging that read, “For Single 
Patient Use Only.  Do not Reuse.”223  According to Kendall, the 
purpose for this notice was for hygienic reasons, since the sleeves 
might become contaminated with a patient’s blood or other bodily 
fluids.224  Although most customers replaced the sleeves after each 
use, not all of them purchased sleeves from Kendall.225  Some 
purchased sleeves from Progressive Medical Technology 
(“Progressive”), the defendant.226  In any event, Kendall’s sale of 
replacement sleeves accounted for about $80 million out of $85 
million dollars in total annual sales.227 
Consequently, Kendall sued Progressive for contributory 
infringement.228  The trial court granted Progressive’s motion for 
partial summary judgment of noninfringement based on the repair 
doctrine, holding that Kendall’s customers acted within their right 
to repair the SCD system by replacing the pressure sleeves after 
each use.229  Without direct infringement, the court could not find 
contributory infringement.230  Kendall appealed.  The issue on 
appeal was whether purchasers of Kendall’s complete SCD system 
“directly infringed the ‘449 patent when they replaced the pressure 
sleeves after a single use with sleeves purchased from someone 
other than Kendall.”231 
In order to determine direct infringement, the court analyzed 
whether Kendall’s customers had an implied license to replace the 
pressure sleeves after each use.232  The court found that Kendall 
had granted its customers an implied license to use the device for 
its useful life.233  Given this implied license, Kendall’s customers 
had the “right to repair the patented article and necessarily to 
 
controller-pneumatic pump for supplying pressurized fluid, a pair of pressure sleeves that 
wrap around a patient’s limbs and controlling tubes.”  Id. 
 223 Id. at 1572. 
 224 Kendall, 85 F.3d 1570. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Kendall, 85 F.3d 1570. 
 231 Id. at 1573. 
 232 See id. 
 233 Id. 
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purchase repair parts from others.”234  The court characterized 
Kendall’s sale as one without restriction, such that direct 
infringement could only occur with complete reconstruction of the 
device.235  Replacement of individual unpatented components was 
considered permissible repair.236   
In Kendall, the court followed the reasoning in Sage and said the 
sleeves were effectively spent, since reusing the sleeves would not 
have been feasible due to the risk of contamination.237  Again, the 
court looked at the patentee’s intent.  The court noted Kendall’s 
mark on the sleeve packaging, “For Single Patient Use Only.  Do 
Not Reuse,” showed Kendall’s intent that it permitted its customers 
to replace the sleeves.238 
The court then distinguished Kendall from Mallinckrodt,239  
claiming that in Kendall the customers followed the single use 
restriction rather than ignoring it.240  Furthermore, the “single use 
only” restriction in Mallinckrodt referred to reusing the entire 
patented device.241  Thus, customers could not buy replacement 
parts under an implied license theory. In addition, Kendall’s 
customers were under no contractual obligation to purchase the 
replacement sleeves from Kendall under the “single patient use” 
restriction.242 
Kendall was more similar to Sage than to Mallinckrodt.  As in 
Sage, the court focused on the replacement of the sleeves as 
permissible repair and not impermissible reconstruction.243  Similar 
to the inner container in Sage, the sleeves were part of the patented 
combination, but not separately patented.244  The problem was not 
 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. at 1574. 
 236 Kendall, 85 F.3d 1570. 
 237 Id. at 1574 (“This court has never said that an element is spent only when it is 
impossible to reuse it.  [W]hen it is neither practical nor feasible to continue using an 
element that is intended to be replaced, that element is effectively spent”) (quoting Sage, 
45 F.3d at 1578). 
 238 Id. at 1575. 
 239 Compare Kendall, 85 F.3d at 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996), with Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 240 Kendall, 85 F.3d at 1576. 
 241 Id. at 1575. 
 242 Id. at 1576. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Claim 1 is illustrative: 
A device for applying compressive pressures against a patient’s limb 
from a source of pressurized fluid, comprising: 
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Kendall’s intent, but that it was trying to expand its monopoly 
beyond that which was granted under the patent.  Application of 
the proposed test would trigger patent misuse.245   
First, the restriction is not made with respect to a separate 
product.  According to the restriction, the entire patented device 
can only be used once the sleeves have been used once.246  
Consequently, this restriction is on the entire device and not tied to 
a separate product.  Second, the “SINGLE USE ONLY” restriction 
forces the buyer to purchase something that need not be bought in 
fixed proportion to the patented devices’ further uses.247  This 
situation is akin to Mallinckrodt, where any use beyond a single 
use was prohibited.248 
In order to control the use of the sleeves, Kendall should have 
secured a design patent on them.  This action is exemplified in the 
court’s comment concerning counsel’s plea that the “sky is 
falling”: 
At oral argument, Kendall’s counsel made a “sky is 
falling” plea, pointing out that an affirmance of the 
district court’s decision would make it 
uneconomical for companies to invent and develop 
devices like that involved in this case, because 
much of the profit arises from sale of the 
replaceable sleeves rather than from sale of the 
 
a pair of first and second elongated pressure sleeves for enclosing a 
length of the patient’s limbs, with said sleeves each having a plurality 
of fluid pressure chambers; 
a first set of plurality conduits in communication with chambers in 
said first sleeve; 
a second set of a plurality of conduits in communication with 
chambers in said second sleeve, with the number of conduits in said 
second set being the same as the number of conduits in said first set; 
a third set of a plurality of conduits in communication with said 
source, with the number of conduits in said third set being the same 
as the number of conduits in said first and second sets; and means for 
connecting the conduits of said first and second sets with each 
conduit in the third set being connected to only one conduit in each of 
said first and second sets to establish communication between the 
source and the first and second sleeves. 
U.S. Patent No. 4,253,449 (issued Mar. 3, 1981) (emphasis added). 
 245 See discussion infra Part II. 
 246 See discussion infra Part II. 
 247 See discussion infra Part II. 
 248 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 700. 
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original device.  If that is so, we are not of course in 
a position to guess whether the result is related to 
the pricing of the original device, the failure to 
obtain effective patent protection for the replaceable 
sleeve, or other factors.249 
Kendall still controls the marketing of the device.  As in Sage, 
Kendall sells the replacement parts.250  Under the PMRA, Kendall 
may tie sales of the sleeves to the tying product, the patented 
device, “unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has 
market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented 
product on which the . . . sale is conditioned.” 251  Whether Kendall 
has market power is unclear, but to avoid an antitrust violation 
under the rule of reason, Kendall would probably have to sell the 
replacement sleeves at a competitive price.252  Instead of 
characterizing the transaction as a tying arrangement, Kendall 
avoided this by placing a single use restriction on its device.253 
A case having issues similar to Mallinckrodt  is Hewlett-Packard 
Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp.254  In this case, Hewlett-
Packard Co. (“HP”), had numerous patents on inventions dealing 
with ink jet printing technology.255  HP manufactures and sells ink 
jet printers having disposable ink jet cartridges.256  “Once the ink 
in a cartridge has been depleted, HP expects the cartridge to be 
discarded and replaced by a new one.”257  In fact, HP disclaims any 
liability for damage to its printers from cartridges that have been 
refilled.258  HP advises the user to “discard old print cartridge 
immediately.”259  HP also warns its customers that print quality 
 
 249 Kendall, 85 F.3d at 1576. 
 250 Id. at 1572. 
 251 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1994). 
 252 “Under the rule of reason, ‘the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned 
practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition taking into account a variety of 
factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before 
and after the restraint was imposed and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.’”  
Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 860 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)). 
 253 See Kendall, 85 F.2d at 1572. 
 254 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
 255 Id. at 1447. 
 256 Id. at 1446. 
 257 Id. at 1447. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. 
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may be damaged through refilling the print cartridges.260 
Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Co. (“ROT”) purchased two types 
of HP ink jet cartridges, one designed for color printing, the other 
for black and white printing.261  Both were designed to be non-
refillable.262  ROT disregarded HP’s advice to “[d]iscard the old 
print cartridge immediately.”263  Instead, ROT purchased these 
cartridges and “modif[ied] them so that they will be refillable, and 
then [resold] them as refillable ink jet cartridges.”264  In addition, 
ROT sold these cartridges in kits including both the modified 
cartridge and color ink refills.265  HP did not manufacture or supply 
this ink.266  ROT had a patent for this cartridge modification that 
covered the product and the process.267   
HP then sued ROT for patent infringement on its twelve 
patents.268  At trial, the district court ruled in favor of ROT on the 
patent infringement claims, and granted summary judgment of 
noninfringement.269 
The court articulated the dispositive point in the case to be 
whether the modification was authorized or whether such 
modification exceeded the original scope of the implied license.270 
In its examination, the court focused on HP’s unconditional sale of 
the cartridges as the reason for why there was no infringement:271 
Generally, when a seller sells a product without restriction, it in 
effect promises the purchaser that in exchange for the price paid, it 
will not interfere with the purchaser’s full enjoyment of the 
 
 260 Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1447. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. at 1448. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. 
 265 The cartridge designed for black and white printing is refillable with color ink 
through ROT’s patented apparatus and method.  Id. at 1449. 
 266 Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1449. 
 267 Id. at 1448; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,408,256 (issued Apr. 18, 1995) (entitled 
“Refillable Color Ink Jet Cartridge and Method for Making Said Cartridge”). 
 268 Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1449-50. 
 269 Id. at 1449.  Note that trademark issues are significant here, because the customer 
is likely to be confused as from which source this product comes.  These are actual HP 
cartridges, but the modification is not made by HP and HP does not warranty their use in 
its printers.  As such, HP won its summary judgment motion regarding trademark 
infringement.  This ruling was not appealed.  Id. 
 270 Id. at 1451. 
 271 Id. 
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purchased product.  The buyer has an implied license under any 
patents of the seller that dominate the product or any uses of the 
product to which the parties might reasonably contemplate the 
product will be put.272 
In this case, the court noted that it was clear that HP sold the 
cartridges ROT purchased without restriction, and no breach of 
contract was asserted.273  Failing to restrict the sales, HP lost the 
right to enforce any of its patents relating to the cartridges sold to 
exclude the purchaser from using or selling them.274  Neither the 
cap nor the ink are recited elements of the claims, thus the 
modification or replacement of the cartridges could not constitute 
infringement.275 
The court also discussed whether modifying the caps on the 
cartridges, so that they could be refilled, is more akin to 
permissible repair than to impermissible reconstruction.276  The 
cap modification is not conventional repair since the caps on the 
cartridges are not broken or defective.277 The modification is also 
not reconstruction, since the cartridge, as a combination, is not 
spent.278  “Furthermore, ROT does not replace any of the elements 
recited in the claims.”279 
“HP’s unilateral intentions cannot change the fact that ROT had 
only modified an unused cartridge that HP sold without 
restriction.”280  Again, the court looked to the useful life of the 
patented product being substantially longer than the life of a single 
reservoir of ink.281  The court, however, cited Mallinckrodt stating 
that “absent a restriction having contractual significance, a 
purchase carries with it the right to modify as long as 
reconstruction of a spent product does not occur.”282   
Repeat-O-Type rejects the idea that a seller’s intent creates a 
limitation on the right of a purchaser to use, sell or modify, absent 
 
 272 Id. at 1451. 
 273 Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1451. 
 274 Id. at 1451-52 (citing Aro II, 377 U.S. at 685). 
 275 See id. at 1451 (outlaying ROT’s arguments for noninfringement). 
 276 Id. at 1452 (citing Kendall Co., 85 F.3d at 1575). 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1452. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. (citing Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 709. 
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a contractual agreement making such restriction.283  Instead, 
Repeat-O-Type was decided on the basis of the exhaustion 
doctrine.284  Because HP only “expected” that the toner cartridges 
would be discarded after they became empty, there was no 
contractual “single use restriction” utilized.285  If, however, HP had 
contractually restricted the toner cartridges to one use, this would 
have amounted to misuse under the proposed test as long as HP did 
not have a patent on the ink or its use.286   
In applying the proposed test, prong one is satisfied because the 
restriction on reusing the toner cartridge was not made on a 
separate product.  The restriction forces the buyer to purchase 
another cartridge, when the cartridge still has a useful life, but just 
needs to be refilled.  Thus, the second prong is also satisfied. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The contemporary law of patents recognizes its own 
anticompetitive effects and embeds the doctrine of patent misuse to 
limit these effects.  Focusing only on the level of competition in 
the market, the antitrust laws police anticompetitive effect.  In 
recent years, there has been a shift away from applying the 
common law doctrine of patent misuse.287  Because antitrust and 
patent misuse flow  from different theoretical foundations, one 
should not completely replace the other.  Some anticompetitive 
behavior still needs to be curtailed when an antitrust violation 
cannot be proven. 
After reviewing the pertinent case law, it is evident that the 
courts have eroded the patent misuse doctrine beyond what is 
statutorily required under the Patent Misuse Reform Act,288 
(PMRA), without deriving any added pro-competitive benefit as 
was originally contemplated by Congress.  Such erosion has 
assisted patentees in masking any anticompetitive effect that could 
 
 283 Id. at 1453. 
 284 See infra Part I.B. 
 285 Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1454. 
 286 See infra Part II. 
 287 See generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, Evaluating Mistakes in Intellectual Property 
Law Configuring the System to Account for Imperfection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. 
L. 167 (2000). 
 288 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994). 
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be lessened by proper application of patent misuse.  In order to 
reinvigorate the historical application of patent misuse, a new test 
should be used to determine when patent misuse should be applied.  
Patent misuse should be found when: (1) a reuse restriction is not 
made with respect to a separate product; and  (2) where the 
restriction forces the buyer to purchase something that need not be 
bought in fixed proportion to the patented device, since the life-
span of the device outlasts the single use. 
 
